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Heterogeneity in psychiatric diagnostic classification 
 
Abstract 
 
The theory and practice of psychiatric diagnosis are central yet contentious. This paper examines the 
heterogeneous nature of categories within the DSM-5, how this heterogeneity is expressed across 
diagnostic criteria, and its consequences for clinicians, clients, and the diagnostic model. Selected 
chapters of the DSM-5 were thematically analysed: schizophrenia spectrum and other psychotic 
disorders; bipolar and related disorders; depressive disorders; anxiety disorders; and trauma- and 
stressor-related disorders. Themes identified heterogeneity in specific diagnostic criteria, including 
symptom comparators, duration of difficulties, indicators of severity, and perspective used to assess 
difficulties. Wider variations across diagnostic categories examined symptom overlap across 
categories, and the role of trauma. Pragmatic criteria and difficulties that recur across multiple 
diagnostic categories offer flexibility for the clinician, but undermine the model of discrete categories 
of disorder. This nevertheless has implications for the way cause is conceptualised, such as implying 
that trauma affects only a limited number of diagnoses despite increasing evidence to the contrary. 
Individual experiences and specific causal pathways within diagnostic categories may also be 
obscured. A pragmatic approach to psychiatric assessment, allowing for recognition of individual 
experience, may therefore be a more effective way of understanding distress than maintaining 
commitment to a disingenuous categorical system. 
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1 Introduction 
 
Developments and amendments to systems of psychiatric classification can be understood within the 
perspective of wider social and cultural developments (Foucault, 1967). Amongst other 
consequences, these socio-political and historical roots have resulted in considerable inherent 
heterogeneity in a wide range of psychiatric diagnoses during their piecemeal development. For 
example, there are stark differences between highly specific diagnostic criteria and those with more 
flexibility around symptom presentation. As a result, there are almost 24,000 possible symptom 
combinations for panic disorder in DSM-5, compared with just one possible combination for social 
phobia (Galatzer-Levy and Bryant, 2013). Olbert and colleagues (2014) also report considerable 
heterogeneity within the criteria of individual diagnoses, showing that in the majority of diagnoses in 
both DSM-IV-TR and DSM-5 (64% and 58.3% respectively), two people could receive the same 
diagnosis without sharing any common symptoms. Such ‘disjunctive’ categories have been described 
as scientifically meaningless. Bannister, for example, pointed out as early as 1968 that the 
‘schizophrenia’ construct was ‘[a] semantic Titanic, doomed before it sails, a concept so diffuse as to 
be unusable in a scientific context’, largely because ‘disjunctive categories are logically too primitive 
for scientific use’ (Bannister, 1968, pp. 181–182). Young and colleagues (2014) memorably calculate 
that in the DSM-5 there are 270 million combinations of symptoms that would meet the criteria for 
both PTSD and major depressive disorder, and when five other commonly made diagnoses are seen 
alongside these two, this figure rises to one quintillion symptom combinations - more than the number 
of stars in the Milky Way.  
 
Diagnostic heterogeneity is problematic for both research and clinical practice. The limitations of 
focusing research on broad diagnostic categories over specific difficulties or distressing experiences 
are increasingly clear. Research into the relationship between childhood abuse and subsequent 
mental health difficulties is hampered by focusing on diagnostic categories (Read and Mayne, 2017), 
because the associations are between specific experiences and symptoms, which disregard 
diagnostic clusters. These associations include, for example, relationships between childhood 
experiences of loss and avoidance/numbing, and between childhood sexual abuse and hyperarousal 
(Read and Mayne, 2017). Furthermore, extensive research in psychosis demonstrates specific causal 
pathways, including between childhood sexual abuse and hearing voices, and institutionalisation and 
paranoia (Bentall et al., 2012). Longstanding focus on diagnostic categories means that evidence-
based recommendations for interventions, both drug treatment and psychological therapies, are 
typically organised by diagnosis (e.g. National Institute for Health and Care Excellence, 2005; NICE, 
2009), rather than on specific patterns or presentations of distress, thus recommendations are broad 
brush rather than individualised. The clinical implications of these diagnostically focused 
recommendations are twofold. First, clients may be referred for a brief psychological intervention for 
depression, for example, that follows a low intensity cognitive behavioural therapy protocol for 
depression (NICE, 2009), with little scope for individualised adaptations according to the specific 
difficulties experienced by the client. Second, clinicians must use alternative methods of clinical 
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decision-making to counter the limitations of heterogeneous diagnostic categories. Drug prescriptions 
are rarely made on the basis of a broad diagnosis, but instead according to the specific symptom 
presentation of the client (Taylor, 2016). Similarly, more specialised psychological therapy delivered 
by a clinical psychologist, for example, is guided by nuanced clinical formulation. Even psychiatrists 
may use a ‘diagnostic formulation’ to further expand upon the broad diagnostic category offered. 
 
Diagnostic heterogeneity is considered in this paper within the ways that the formal protocol of 
classification is applied in clinical practice to serve particular functions, and the impact that 
heterogeneity can have in the potential “slippage” (Star & Lampland, 2009, p. 15) between the two 
(Suchman, 1987). This study therefore examined the sources of heterogeneity within and across 
diagnostic categories. The consequences of heterogeneity were investigated; for clinicians, clients, 
and the theoretical conceptualisation of psychiatric diagnoses. 
 
2 Method 
 
For the purposes of manageability, this analysis focussed on five chapters of DSM-5: schizophrenia 
spectrum and other psychotic disorders; bipolar and related disorders; depressive disorders; anxiety 
disorders; and trauma- and stressor-related disorders. These chapters were chosen to reflect 
commonly reported ‘functional’ psychiatric diagnoses as highlighted by the Adult Psychiatric Morbidity 
Survey, including ‘common mental disorders’, depression- and anxiety-related diagnoses (Stansfeld 
et al., 2016), and PTSD, bipolar, and psychotic disorder diagnoses (McManus et al., 2016). One 
common diagnosis (McManus et al., 2016) that is not contained within the included chapters is 
‘obsessive-compulsive disorder’. Although previously listed within anxiety disorders in the DSM-IV-TR 
(American Psychiatric Association, 2000), the DSM-5 lists this diagnosis within its own chapter 
(obsessive-compulsive and related disorders), which contains numerous other diagnoses that are 
new and less common, such as ‘trichotillomania’ (hair pulling) and ‘excoriation’ (skin picking). This 
chapter, therefore, was excluded for the purposes of this analysis. Childhood diagnoses (e.g. ‘reactive 
attachment disorder’; ‘disruptive mood dysregulation disorder’) were also excluded to enable 
consideration of diagnostic categories with the potential for consistency across assessment and 
reporting (for example, self-reporting of distress). 
 
2.1 Analysis 
 
Thematic analysis (Braun & Clarke, 2006) was used to code themes or patterns of meaning across 
the diagnostic categories being analysed, with a particular focus on the heterogeneity or differences 
across the types of diagnostic criteria. Thematic analysis was used to identify the ways in which 
heterogeneity was represented across diagnostic categories, and to organise this heterogeneity into 
central themes of differences across the criteria. The first phase of the analysis focused on identifying 
heterogeneity or differences between the diagnostic criteria of each category within the five chapters 
analysed. Four areas of heterogeneity were identified within specific diagnostic criteria, and two that 
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spanned across diagnostic categories. During this phase of coding, data were extracted from each set 
of diagnostic criteria in each of the five chapters, and coded line by line to the themes above. 
Subthemes were generated from the information within two codes (Standards to which symptoms are 
compared, and Duration of symptoms) as different ways of representing these themes emerged 
across diagnostic categories. The emergent coding framework was reviewed by authors PK and RC, 
with the aim of presenting alternative interpretations of the data. The coding framework was refined 
accordingly following discussions.  
 
3 Findings 
 
Heterogeneity in diagnostic criteria was found across each of the chapters of the DSM-5 that were 
examined; both within specific types of criteria, and more broadly across diagnostic categories. These 
themes are outlined in Table 1. Unless otherwise specified, page numbers refer to the DSM-5. 
 
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
3.1 Heterogeneity within specific diagnostic criteria 
 
3.1.1 The standards to which symptoms are compared  
 
TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
A key element of heterogeneity stems from differences in the comparison of the experience of 
symptoms with subjectively normal or assumed normative functioning (or in the omission of such 
comparators). Diagnostic criteria are represented either by no comparator, or a change from previous 
functioning, behaviour, or mood. In particular, some experiences (such as low mood) are seen as 
problematic only at a particular threshold, while other experiences (such as hallucinations) are 
indicative of disorder by their presence alone. 
 
3.1.1.1 Comparisons with prior experience 
 
Most criteria specifying either change or comparisons with prior functioning or experience are mood-
related (criteria which are also included within the diagnosis of schizoaffective disorder). Some 
descriptions explicitly note a comparison, for example, criterion A for a major depressive episode 
states, “[f]ive (or more) of the following symptoms have been present during the same 2-week period 
and represent a change from previous functioning” (p. 160). Other criteria imply a comparison with 
previous mood, for example, criterion A for persistent depressive disorder (dysthymia) requires 
“[d]epressed mood for most of the day…” (p. 168); criterion A for a manic episode requires “[a] distinct 
period of abnormally and persistently elevated, expansive, or irritable mood and abnormally and 
persistently increased goal-directed activity or energy” (p. 124); criteria B2 and B3 for both manic and 
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hypomanic episodes are “decreased need for sleep…” and “more talkative than usual…” (p. 124) 
respectively. Each of these implies comparison with a usual or acceptable behaviour or mood, such 
as sleep, which is altered to a problematic extent. Some of the criteria for schizophreniform disorder 
and schizophrenia diagnoses also imply a change from usual mood or motivation, including ‘negative 
symptoms’, described as “diminished emotional expression or avolition” (p. 99).  
 
3.1.1.2 Comparison with socially expected responses 
 
Within mood episodes, and criteria for some anxiety and trauma-related diagnoses, there is a notion 
of ‘excessive’ behaviours or responses, suggesting a comparison with a socially expected response. 
For example, criterion B7 of manic and hypomanic episodes requires “excessive involvement in 
activities that have a high potential for painful consequences (e.g. engaging in unrestrained buying 
sprees, sexual indiscretions, or foolish business investments)” (p. 124). Criterion B7 of a major 
depressive episode assesses “feelings of worthlessness or excessive or inappropriate guilt…” (p. 
125). Separation anxiety disorder similarly assesses “persistent and excessive worry" (A2, p. 190). In 
another way of assessing a person’s response in comparison with expected responses, specific 
phobia and adjustment disorder both require the response to be “out of proportion” (pp. 197, 286), 
with either the object or situation (social phobia) or the stressor (adjustment disorder). A subjective 
judgement is required to assess whether a person’s experiences are out of line with typically expected 
responses. This is discussed further in the theme of ‘Perspective from which distress is assessed’. 
 
3.1.1.3 No comparators 
 
By contrast, other criteria do not compare symptoms with a person’s previous experience. This is 
particularly apparent for ‘positive symptoms’ of psychosis; the presence of delusions and 
hallucinations, for example, is never stated in diagnostic criteria alongside comparison. Non-
compared examples from mood disorder diagnoses include “feelings of worthlessness” or “recurrent 
thoughts of death…” (criteria A7 and A9, respectively, of a major depressive episode), and “flight of 
ideas…” or “distractibility…” (criteria B4 and B5, respectively, of manic and hypomanic episodes). The 
mood disorders chapters give a mixed presentation of criteria with both comparators and no 
comparators. Three or more of the experiences described in criterion B must be present for 
identification of a manic or hypomanic episode, meaning that presentations of these episodes could 
reflect either discontinuous experiences, experiences across a continuum, or a mixture of the two. 
The criteria for PTSD and acute stress disorder notably omit comparators; “[r]ecurrent, involuntary, 
and intrusive distressing memories of the traumatic event(s)” (B1, e.g. p. 271) and “dissociative 
reactions (e.g. flashbacks)…” (B3, e.g. p. 271) are examples of criteria for both these diagnoses that 
are compared with neither expected responses nor prior functioning. By not using comparators, these 
experiences are set up as inherently disordered or pathological and so are inconsistent with 
continuum models of functioning. 
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The diagnostic criteria for PTSD and acute stress disorder nevertheless require a change in thoughts, 
behaviours and emotions following trauma. The criteria are also explicit about the severity of trauma 
experienced, after which it would be expected that most people would experience distress. However, 
there are no comparators to identify what a ‘normal’ or ‘appropriate’ response to such a severe 
stressor would entail. That is, there is no information about how to identify at what point someone has 
a ‘disordered’ response as opposed to one that is ‘normal’. In the case of the criteria for panic 
disorder, behaviour change related to panic attacks is constructed as unusual or unacceptable by 
what is described as ‘maladaptive’ criteria, despite this behaviour (such as “behaviors designed to 
avoid having panic attacks”, p. 208) representing attempts to cope with the experience of panic 
attacks. 
 
3.1.2 Duration of symptoms 
 
There were three subthemes representing heterogeneity within the duration of symptoms or 
experiences described by diagnostic criteria in the DSM-5: no duration, discrete episodes, and a 
minimum duration. These timeframes effectively construct different ‘kinds’ of disorder categories. 
 
TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
3.1.2.1 Minimum duration 
 
Most of the analysed diagnostic categories have a minimum duration requirement. For example, 
continuous signs of disturbance for at least 6 months (schizophrenia, Criterion C), or at least 2 years 
of depressed mood (persistent depressive disorder - dysthymia - Criterion A). In the absence of other 
indicators of ‘disorder’ (such as biomedical markers), a minimum duration requirement constructs a 
definition of severity. Giving a minimum duration criterion creates a way of separating between 
‘everyday’ distress and that which is considered ‘clinical’, or otherwise abnormal and therefore in need 
of support. 
 
3.1.2.2 No duration 
 
The criteria for certain diagnoses do not use a timeframe. For example, each chapter (with the 
exception of trauma-related disorders) includes difficulties ‘due to other medical conditions’, with no 
particular duration needed to meet these criteria. These diagnoses must be the ‘direct 
pathophysiological consequence of another medical condition’ (e.g. p. 120). This use of physiological 
signs set these diagnoses apart from other functional diagnoses, suggesting that functional diagnoses 
use timeframes to bolster descriptive diagnoses in the absence of physiological markers. 
 
Other diagnoses that do not require a particular duration are ‘other specified’ and ‘unspecified’ 
diagnoses at the end of each of chapter. These categories have very broad criteria because they are 
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specifically included to incorporate difficulties that do not meet the criteria for other diagnoses. The 
experiences have to be characteristic of other diagnoses in their chapter, and cause clinically 
significant distress or impairment in functioning (discussed later). However, the ‘unspecified’ 
diagnoses do not list any criteria, leaving these categories entirely open to clinical judgement. The 
‘other specified’ diagnoses for the schizophrenia spectrum and other psychotic disorders, bipolar and 
related disorders and anxiety disorders chapters give options, without durations, for specified 
difficulties. For example, ‘persistent auditory hallucinations occurring in the absence of any other 
features’, a much briefer criterion than those used for the other diagnoses within the schizophrenia 
spectrum and other psychotic disorders chapter. 
 
3.1.2.3 Discrete episodes 
 
Least common are diagnoses that represent discrete episodes, with a specific duration such as one 
day to one month (e.g. brief psychotic disorder) or 3 days to 1 month after trauma exposure (acute 
stress disorder p. 281). The symptoms associated with adjustment disorders must occur within 3 
months of a stressor and not persist for more than 6 months “once the stressor and its consequences 
have terminated” (Criterion E, p. 287). These episodic diagnoses suggest either an expectation of an 
end point that is not present for those with a minimum duration, or, more pragmatically, allow 
difficulties to be diagnosed (and treated) before the minimum time period is reached for other 
diagnoses such as PTSD. 
 
Bipolar and depressive disorders are treated differently again. The bipolar and related disorders 
chapter (including, e.g. cyclothymia) and the category of major depressive disorder are unique in that 
several episodes are combined in various ways to produce disorders presented as distinct from one 
another. Major depressive and manic episodes are the two key episodes from which hypomanic 
episode (shorter duration and lesser severity than manic episode) and a mixed features specifier 
(criteria are met for one episode, with features of another during the same timeframe) are derived. 
The three episodes are then variously combined to create eight different diagnostic categories (seven 
bipolar-related diagnoses, and major depressive disorder). 
 
3.1.3 Identifiers of severity 
 
TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
In some cases, severity indicators are prioritised over duration requirements, for example, where 
hospitalisation or the presence of psychotic features render consideration of duration unnecessary 
(manic episodes and bipolar and related disorders due to another medical condition). Most categories 
stipulate a criterion of “clinically significant distress or impairment in social, occupational, or other 
important areas of functioning” (e.g. criterion B, major depressive disorder, p. 161), to establish a 
particular threshold for diagnosis (p. 21). However, the threshold is not defined, and therefore 
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represents a subjective judgement, presumably the clinician’s. A separate concept of a marked 
change in social, occupational or other areas of functioning (schizophrenia; manic episode) allows the 
criterion to be met in the absence of distress. These variations across criteria demonstrate the 
pragmatic nature of diagnostic categories and their use as clinical tools. For example, if a person’s 
behaviour is distressing to others, but not to themselves, the clinician has the flexibility to override the 
need for clinically significant distress and make the diagnosis regardless. 
 
DSM-5 contains a dimensional severity rating of 0-4 for each criterion A symptom for delusional, brief 
psychotic, schizophreniform and schizoaffective disorder criteria. This may, for example, relate to 
either the pressure to respond to voices or delusions or to what extent the individual is bothered by 
this experience. For other experiences, such as disorganised speech, the rating is pragmatically 
based on clinical observation rather than the individual’s experience of these difficulties, so that the 
individual is not required to recognise their own disordered speech. Other mood-related diagnoses 
(bipolar, major depression, and related disorders) can be rated using a broad dimensional specifier of 
mild, moderate, severe, or with psychotic features. 
 
3.1.4 Perspective from which distress is assessed 
 
TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE  
 
This theme describes the point of view from which distress or other diagnostic criteria are assessed, 
for example, from the account of the individual being assessed, others around them (e.g. family or 
friends), or the assessing clinician. In general, the DSM-5 represents a shift towards the perspective 
of the observer, whereas several DSM-IV-TR diagnoses relied on the individual as the principal (or 
only) source of information. For example, for DSM-IV-TR social phobia (social anxiety disorder in 
DSM-5), reference is made to “marked distress about having the phobia” (criterion E) and that the 
“person recognises that the fear is excessive or unreasonable” (criterion C). In comparison, whilst the 
fears themselves are self-reported in the DSM-5 version of social anxiety disorder, the criteria 
otherwise rely on the perspective of the observer. Represented within this shift towards the 
perspective of the observer is an assumption about insight and the capacity to self-report; an 
assumption frequently associated with psychotic experiences. However, this assumption is not 
explicitly stated in the diagnoses, and therefore reinforces the fallacious assumption that all people 
experiencing mental health problems tend to ‘lack insight’. Thus, the distress criterion is removed and 
the individual need not recognise that their fear is excessive, as the clinician makes this judgement. In 
another example, reference to “excessive involvement in activities that have a high potential for 
painful consequences (e.g. engaging in unrestrained buying sprees, sexual indiscretions, or foolish 
business investments)” (manic and hypomanic episodes, p. 124) constructs a socially accepted level 
at which the behaviours are considered normal versus abnormal. The perspective here demonstrates 
the power held by the assessing clinician (or others, such as family) by virtue of the diagnostic criteria 
sanctioning the making of a value judgement. For other diagnoses, this person’s perspective is 
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implied but not explicit, for instance, experiences such as distress and distressing memories, 
flashbacks and physiological reactions (PTSD, Criterion B). Finally, in many cases, the question of 
perspective (who is making the judgment as to whether the criterion is met) is unambiguously 
ambiguous, as in the case of major depressive episode; “as indicated by subjective report… or 
observation made by others”. In a pragmatic approach, information is collected, from a range of 
sources, to assess whether or not the diagnostic criteria are met. 
 
3.2 Wider heterogeneity across diagnostic categories 
 
3.2.1 Symptom overlap across categories 
 
TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE 
 
 
 
Similar or the same experiences occur in multiple diagnostic categories. Major depressive episode, 
for example, features within the criteria for major depressive disorder, bipolar and related disorders, 
and can be included within the criteria for schizoaffective disorder (for which criterion A requires the 
occurrence of “a major mood episode (major depressive or manic)”, p. 105). Likewise, hallucinations 
can occur in schizophrenia and other psychotic disorders, but also in major depressive disorder with 
psychotic features, bipolar and related disorders (except cyclothymia), and PTSD. 
 
DSM-5 refers to bipolar disorders bridging between psychotic disorders and depressive disorders, 
and likewise that schizoaffective disorder bridges several diagnoses. Despite this repetition of 
experiences, there is no explicit statement provided in the DSM about the phenomenological or 
qualitative experience of symptoms across different diagnoses. The DSM-5 acknowledges,  
 
Although DSM-5 remains a categorical classification of separate disorders, we recognize that 
mental disorders do not always fit completely within the boundaries of a single disorder. Some 
symptom domains, such as depression and anxiety, involve multiple diagnostic categories 
and may reflect common underlying vulnerabilities for a larger group of disorders… (p. xli) 
 
Ten specifiers are provided with the DSM-5 to allow the clinician to represent other patterns not 
contained within the main diagnostic criteria for bipolar and major depressive disorders, such as with 
anxious distress, rapid cycling (for bipolar and related disorders), or psychotic features. The range of 
experiences incorporated within these specifiers acknowledges the heterogeneity of diagnoses. 
Depressive episodes are no longer required in DSM-5 criteria for bipolar I, and the diagnostic criteria 
for cyclothymic disorder incorporates only experiences that are sub-threshold for both hypomania and 
a major depressive episode. These changes and the additional specifier of ‘anxious distress’ for 
bipolar and MDD diagnoses represents a shift towards broadening the range of experiences captured 
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by the same diagnostic labels. The ‘mixed features’ specifier further blurs the boundary between 
depression and bipolar diagnoses in that it can be added to episodes of depression within the context 
of major depressive disorder where there are symptoms of mania or hypomania present. Likewise, 
panic attacks can be used as an adjunct to any DSM-5 diagnosis, and catatonia can be specified 
across various diagnoses spanning several chapters (including neurodevelopmental, psychotic, 
bipolar, and depressive disorder diagnoses, and other medical conditions).  
 
3.2.2 The role of trauma 
 
The DSM-5 states at the outset the atheoretical nature of diagnostic categories, however, one chapter 
of diagnoses is explicitly framed as caused by or directly influenced by external factors; trauma- and 
stressor-related disorders. The conceptualisation constructed by this addition of causal information is 
a notable difference from the other analysed chapters. For example, despite PTSD being described 
as a response to an extreme traumatic stressor that would be distressing for anyone to experience 
(“Exposure to actual or threatened death, serious injury, or sexual violence…” criterion A, p. 271), in 
assigning the diagnosis the individual’s response is categorised as disordered. A related dilemma can 
be seen in the remarkable semantic similarity between various criteria for schizophrenia and PTSD 
diagnoses in DSM-5. These include affective flattening and avolition, as well as hallucinations, 
dissociative flashback episodes, restricted range of affect, and markedly diminished interest or 
participation in significant activities. All of these experiences would, in the presence of a traumatic 
event, be broadly consistent with a diagnosis of PTSD. Furthermore, Table 7 illustrates the diagnoses 
explicitly associated with trauma in DSM-5, and the DSM-5 diagnoses that have been associated with 
childhood trauma or adverse life experiences. 
 
TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE 
 
4 Discussion 
 
As the DSM-5 acknowledges that experiences do not always fit within the boundaries of a specific 
disorder, its rules are therefore internally inconsistent. The manual presents a classification of 
discrete, homogeneous disorders, yet acknowledges that this structure cannot always be followed 
due to the overlap between diagnostic categories. Much of the heterogeneity identified in the above 
analysis is borne out of pragmatic consideration for the application of the DSM-5 into clinical practice. 
These allowances introduce flexibility for the clinician; giving the possibility of categorising extraneous 
symptoms that do not fit neatly within a diagnosis, or identifying experiences or behaviours as 
distressing or disruptive for others despite not necessarily being distressing for the individual being 
assessed. Yet, this heterogeneous flexibility has important consequences for the diagnostic 
classification’s model of discrete disorders and the way cause is understood. 
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4.1 Theoretical implications: Threats to the model of discrete disorders 
 
The introduction of methods of clinical flexibility and transdiagnostic clinical features, such as ‘anxious 
distress’ or ‘psychotic features’, are contradictory to the DSM-5’s underpinning model of discrete 
disorders. Within diagnostic criteria, the same diagnosis may be applied in different ways by the 
clinician to suit individual situations and presentations. Whilst clinically practical, such criteria 
introduce heterogeneity and detract from the DSM-5’s presentation of diagnoses as rigorously and 
consistently applied criteria that represent stable, homogeneous disorders. In respect of these threats 
to the diagnostic model whereby clinical utility is prioritised over theoretical consistency, it would be 
more useful to adopt an assessment approach that embraces this pragmatism, without 
simultaneously attempting to do this within the confines of a strict diagnostic model. 
 
4.2 Clinical implications: Understanding cause 
 
By making reference to trauma or stressors only in one dedicated chapter, the DSM-5 implies that 
other diagnostic categories are unrelated to trauma. The consideration of social, psychological, or 
other adversities within diagnoses is therefore minimised; symptoms are constructed as anomalous or 
disordered, rather than potentially understandable in relation to a person’s life experiences. Even 
within the trauma- and stressor-related disorders chapter, the experiences assessed, despite being 
specifically linked with trauma, are seen as symptomatic of a disordered or inappropriate response to 
that trauma. The reverse of the implications of singling out one trauma-related chapter is 
acknowledged by Spitzer and First; in their response to the suggestion of clustering diagnostic 
categories by cause, they stated:  
 
Most problematic is the characterization of the first cluster as patients with “brain disease.” 
Psychiatry has abandoned the reductionist “organic” vs “functional” distinction and now regards 
all mental disorders as disorders of brain function. It would be a big leap backward to delineate 
a subgroup of DSM disorders as involving “brain disease” with the implication that in other 
mental disorders brain functioning is unimpaired (Spitzer & First, 2005, p. 1898). 
 
By the same logic the same can be said of the role of trauma; for the majority of the DSM-5 diagnostic 
categories, the criteria suggest to clinicians that these difficulties are caused by the disorder (and 
implicitly that these disorders are associated with brain function), and may therefore limit exploration 
further than identification of the disorder. However, just as Wakefield (2013) describes how stressors 
other than grief might also be related to experiences of low mood and depression, accumulating 
evidence demonstrates that trauma or adversity is involved in the development of many conditions 
and symptoms including psychosis and bipolar disorder (Bentall et al., 2012; Palmier-Claus et al., 
2016; Varese et al., 2012). Clinical implications may include a focus on symptom reduction, on 
reducing those experiences seen as inherently disordered, such as voice hearing, rather than on 
removing only the distress associated with the experiences. In addition, labelling distress as abnormal 
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may in itself create further distress. For example, flashbacks in the context of trauma are distressing 
in themselves, but the diagnosis has the potential to make the experience more distressing because 
the flashbacks are regarded as abnormal.  
 
Furthermore, by obscuring heterogeneity within categories, psychiatric diagnoses arguably obscure 
causal heterogeneity or other key differences between individuals (Olbert, Gala & Tupler, 2014). 
Evidence already suggests that there may be distinct pathways in the development of specific 
experiences identified within the diagnostic criteria of schizophrenia, for example, strong associations 
between childhood sexual abuse and hallucinations, compared with childhood neglect or 
institutionalisation and paranoia (Bentall et al., 2014). Likewise, in the drive to create unique 
diagnostic entities by separating collections of experiences from each other, potentially important 
similarities in the experiences, or even processes, that exist across diagnoses may be lost. An 
example of this may include similar causal mechanisms for voice-hearing by individuals diagnosed 
with either bipolar disorder or schizophrenia (e.g. Hammersley et al., 2003). 
 
5 Conclusions 
 
This analysis of chapters of the DSM-5 demonstrates that multiple forms of heterogeneity are found 
across and within diagnostic categories. This heterogeneity has important implications for research, 
clinical practice, and the provision of care that is specific to a person’s individual needs. Pragmatic 
diagnostic criteria and idiosyncrasies offer flexibility for psychiatrists to use ‘clinical judgement’, but 
they undermine the model of discrete categories of disorder. Yet the diagnostic model still has 
implications for the way that cause is understood; limited reference to trauma implies that it affects 
only a limited number of diagnoses, despite increasing evidence to the contrary. Furthermore, by 
focusing on diagnostic categories, individual experiences of distress and specific causal pathways 
may be obscured. A pragmatic approach to psychiatric assessment, which allows for recognition of 
individual experience, may therefore be a more effective way of understanding distress than 
maintaining a commitment to a disingenuous categorical system. 
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Table 1 
Outline of themes and subthemes 
 
Heterogeneity within specific diagnostic criteria 
The standards to which symptoms are compared 
Comparisons with prior experience 
Comparison with socially expected responses 
No comparators 
Duration of symptoms 
Minimum duration 
No duration 
Discrete episodes 
Identifiers of severity 
Perspective from which distress is assessed 
Heterogeneity across diagnostic categories 
Symptom overlap across categories 
The role of trauma 
 
 
 
Table 2 
The standards to which symptoms are compared  
 
Subtheme Example from DSM-5 
 
Comparisons with prior 
experience 
 
Major depressive episode: “[f]ive (or more) of the following symptoms 
have been present during the same 2-week period and represent a 
change from previous functioning” (Criterion A, p. 160).  
 
Persistent depressive disorder (dysthymia): “[d]epressed mood for most 
of the day…” (Criterion A, p. 168)  
 
Manic episode: episode requires “[a] distinct period of abnormally and 
persistently elevated, expansive, or irritable mood and abnormally and 
persistently increased goal-directed activity or energy” (Criterion A, p. 
124) 
 
Manic and hypomanic episodes: “decreased need for sleep…” and 
“more talkative than usual…” (Criteria B2 and B3, p. 124) 
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Comparison with socially 
expected responses 
 
Manic and hypomanic episodes: “excessive involvement in activities that 
have a high potential for painful consequences (e.g. engaging in 
unrestrained buying sprees, sexual indiscretions, or foolish business 
investments)” (Criterion B7, p. 124) 
 
Major depressive episode: “feelings of worthlessness or excessive or 
inappropriate guilt…” (Criterion B7, p. 125) 
 
Separation anxiety disorder: “persistent and excessive worry" (Criterion 
A2, p. 190) 
 
 
No comparators 
 
Major depressive episode: “feelings of worthlessness” or “recurrent 
thoughts of death…” (Criteria A7 and A9, p.125) 
 
Manic and hypomanic episodes: “flight of ideas…” or “distractibility…” 
(Criteria B4 and B5, p.124) 
 
PTSD and acute stress disorder: “[r]ecurrent, involuntary, and intrusive 
distressing memories of the traumatic event(s)” or “dissociative reactions 
(e.g. flashbacks)…” (B1, e.g. p. 271) and (B3, e.g. p. 271) 
 
 
Table 3 
Duration of symptoms 
 
Subtheme Example from DSM-5 
 
Minimum duration 
 
 
Schizophrenia: “Continuous signs of disturbance for at least 6 months” 
(Criterion C, p. 99) 
 
Persistent depressive disorder (dysthymia): “at least 2 years of 
depressed mood” (Criterion A, p. 139) 
 
 
No duration 
 
Difficulties ‘due to other medical conditions’: All chapters, with the 
exception of trauma-related disorders 
 
Discrete episodes 
 
Brief psychotic disorder: A specific duration such as one day to one 
month (Criterion B, p. 94) 
 
Acute stress disorder: 3 days to 1 month after trauma exposure 
(Criterion C p. 281).  
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Adjustment disorders: The symptoms associated with must occur within 
3 months of a stressor and not persist for more than 6 months “once the 
stressor and its consequences have terminated” (Criterion E, p.287) 
 
The bipolar and related disorders chapter (including, e.g. cyclothymia) 
and the category of major depressive disorder are unique in that several 
episodes are combined in various ways to produce disorders presented 
as distinct from one another. 
 
 
 
Table 4 
Identifiers of severity 
 
Method of identifying 
severity 
Example from DSM-5 
 
Clinically significant 
distress 
 
 
Major depressive disorder;  
Post-traumatic stress disorder;  
Acute stress disorder:  
“Clinically significant distress or impairment in social, occupational, or 
other important areas of functioning” (e.g. Criterion B, p. 161) 
 
Marked change 
 
Schizophrenia: “For a significant portion of the time since the onset of 
the disturbance, level of functioning in one or more major areas, such as 
work, interpersonal relations, or self-care, is markedly below the level 
achieved prior to the onset…” (Criterion B, p. 99) 
Manic episode: “marked impairment in social or occupational 
functioning…” (Criterion C, p. 124) 
 
Dimensional severity rating Delusional, brief psychotic, schizophreniform and schizoaffective 
disorders: Dimensional severity rating of 0-4 for each Criterion A 
symptom for criteria. This may, for example, relate to either the pressure 
to respond to voices or delusions or to what extent the individual is 
bothered by this experience. For other experiences, such as 
disorganised speech, the rating is pragmatically based on clinical 
observation rather than the individual’s experience of these difficulties 
 
Dimensional specifier Mood-related diagnoses (bipolar, major depression, and related 
disorders): Can be rated using a broad dimensional specifier of mild, 
moderate, severe, or with psychotic features. 
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Table 5 
Perspective from which distress is assessed 
 
Subtheme Example from DSM-5 
 
Self-report 
 
Manic and hypomanic episodes: “decreased need for sleep (e.g. feels 
rested after only 3 hours of sleep)” (Criterion B2, p. 124) 
 
Persistent depressive disorder (dysthymia): e.g. “low energy” (Criterion 
B2, p. 168; “low self-esteem” (Criterion B4, p. 168) 
 
Pre-menstrual dysphoric disorder: e.g. “marked irritability…” (Criterion 
B2, p. 172); “lethargy” (Criterion C3, p. 172) 
 
Panic disorder: “persistent concern or worry about additional panic 
attacks…” (Criterion B1, p. 208) 
 
Generalised anxiety disorder: “the individual finds it difficult to control the 
worry” (Criterion B, p. 222) 
 
Post-traumatic stress disorder: “e.g. “recurrent, involuntary, and intrusive 
distressing memories of the traumatic event” (Criterion B1, p. 271) 
 
Clinician’s judgement 
 
Manic and hypomanic episodes: “During the period of mood 
disturbance… the following symptoms… are present to a significant 
degree and represent a noticeable change from usual behaviour” 
(Criterion B, p. 124) 
 
Major depressive episode & Major depressive disorder: “psychomotor 
agitation or retardation… observable by others; not merely subjective 
feelings of restlessness or being slowed down” (Criterion A5, p. 161) 
 
Separation anxiety disorder: “Developmentally inappropriate and 
excessive fear or anxiety…” (Criterion A, p. 190) 
 
 
Ambiguous or unstated 
perspective 
Manic and hypomanic episodes: “inflated self-esteem or grandiosity” 
“distractibility… as reported or observed”; “Excessive involvement in 
activities that have a high potential for painful consequences (e.g. 
engaging in unrestrained buying sprees, sexual indiscretions, or foolish 
business investments)” (Criteria B1; B5, and B7, respectively, p. 124) 
 
Major depressive episode & Major depressive disorder: “Depressed 
mood… as indicated by either subjective report… or observation by 
others…”; “Markedly diminished interest or pleasure… as indicated by 
either subjective account or observation“; “Feelings of worthlessness or 
excessive or inappropriate guilt…”; “Diminished ability to think or 
concentrate…either be subjective account or as observed by others” 
(Criteria A1, A2, A7, and A8, respectively, p. 160-1) 
 
Running head: Heterogeneity in psychiatric diagnostic classification 
 
20 
 
Specific phobia & social anxiety disorder (social phobia): “The fear or 
anxiety is out of proportion to the actual danger posed by the specific 
object or situation and to the sociocultural context” 
 
All schizophrenia & psychotic disorders; Presence of hallucinations 
and/or delusions 
 
 
Table 6 
Symptom overlap across categories 
 
Specifier Diagnostic categories to which this specifier can be added 
 
Anxious distress 
 
 
Bipolar and related disorders 
Depressive disorders 
Psychotic features Bipolar and related disorders 
Depressive disorders 
Schizophrenia spectrum and other psychotic disorders 
Trauma and stressor related disorders 
Neurocognitive disorders 
Personality disorders   
 
Rapid cycling  
 
Bipolar and related disorders 
Mixed features Depressive episode 
Bipolar and related disorders 
Anxiety disorders 
 
Panic attacks Any DSM-5 diagnosis 
Catatonia Neurodevelopmental disorders 
Psychotic disorders 
Bipolar disorder 
Major depressive disorder 
Other medical conditions 
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Table 7 
Relationship between DSM-5 diagnoses and trauma  
 
DSM-5 diagnoses with 
explicit mention of 
trauma 
DSM-5 diagnoses with associations with childhood adversities/ 
trauma, demonstrated through meta-analyses 
 
Acute stress disorder 
PTSD 
Adjustment disorders 
 
 
Depression (Mandelli et al., 2015) 
Anxiety (Lindert et al., 2013) 
Obsessive compulsive disorder (OCD) (Miller and Brock, 2017) 
Non-suicidal self-harm (Liu et al., 2016) 
Functional neurological (conversion) disorders / medically unexplained 
symptoms (Ludwig et al., 2018) 
Dissociation (Rafiq et al., 2018; Vonderlin et al., 2018) 
Eating disorders (Molendijk et al., 2017) 
Schizophrenia and psychotic disorders (Varese et al., 2012) 
Bipolar disorder and related disorders (Palmier-Claus et al., 2016) 
 
 
